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Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler:
Genetic Engineering and NEPA's EIS
Requirement
I. Introduction
Until recently, genetic experiments involving recombinant
DNA research have been confined to the research laboratory.'
In 1983, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), in a decision
aided by its Recombinant Advisory Committee (RAC), ap-
proved the third of three proposals for the deliberate release
of genetically altered materials into the environment. Subse-
quently, a suit headed by Jeremy Rifkin of the Foundation on
Economic Trends was brought against federal officials respon-
sible for the supervision of scientific research conducted at or
by NIH.2 Plaintiffs alleged that when NIH made several deci-
sions associated with genetic experimentation, it violated the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)5 and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'
On May 16, 1984, Judge Sirica of the D.C. District Court
in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler (Heckler ),
granted a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining delib-
erate release experimentation.6 The injunction halted the
most imminently scheduled deliberate release experiment 7 as
1. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler (Heckler I), 587 F. Supp. 753, 755
(D.D.C. 1984), affd, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
2. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 754.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982)
4. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
5. 587 F. Supp. at 753.
6. Id. at 769. The injunction specifically halted, inter alia, the commencement of
a potato-crop experiment to be conducted by scientists at the University of California
at Berkeley. The experiment involves the application of genetically altered bacteria to
a crop of potatoes to help make them frost resistant. Id. at 753.
7. Besides the potato-crop experiment which is the subject of this litigation, two
others were approved by NIH. One was a field test of genetically modified corn plants
to be conducted by Dr. Ronald Davis of Stanford University and the other was a field
1
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well as the approval of any proposals for similar experimenta-
tion until a final judgment on the merits of the alleged NEPA
and APA violations is reached.
On February 27, 1985, Judge Wright of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the part of Judge Sirica's prelimi-
nary injunction that enjoined the individual deliberate release
experiment, ruling that "NIH has not yet displayed the rigor-
ous attention to environmental concerns demanded by law."'
According to the court, until an appropriate environmental as-
sessment is completed, release of the modified bacteria is pro-
hibited.' However, the part of the preliminary injunction that
enjoined NIH from approving any similar experiments was va-
cated because of its extreme broadness.10
This Note discusses whether NEPA is applicable to the
deliberate release experimentation that is the subject of
Rifkin's pending suit, the need for its proper implementation,
and the potential impact of NEPA on the field of genetic en-
gineering. The conclusion is that NEPA should be applied
only to NIH's decision to approve the individual deliberate
release experiment, should not be applied to mere administra-
tive decisions, and if complied with, should not hinder ad-
vances in scientific technology unless possible environmental
dangers exist.
II. Background
A. Genetic Engineering
Genetic engineering involves the splitting, rearranging,
and recombining of a subcellular unit known as deoxy-
test of genetically modified tomato and tobacco plants to be conducted by Dr. John
Sanford of Cornell University. Both experiments, however, were abandoned due to
feasibility problems. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler (Heckler II), 756
F.2d 143, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
8. Heckler 11, 756 F.2d at 146.
9. Id. NIH finally released a 60-page Environmental Assessment declaring a neg-
ative impact on the environment in early February. NIH Director Rules Out Envi-
ronmental Hazard in Altered Ice-Minus Microbe, Biotech. Newswatch, Feb. 4, 1985
at 3. The February 27 court of appeals decision, however, was not based on this Envi-
ronmental Assessment since the appeal was argued on December 5, 1984.
10. Heckler 11, 756 F.2d at 146.
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ribonucleic acid (DNA). The product of this process, known as
"recombinant DNA," is used by scientists to control the natu-
ral processes of organism reproduction, metabolism, and
growth.1
More specifically, recombinant DNA involves gene clon-
ing, a process which essentially produces an unlimited number
of identical organisms. A gene-the hereditary determinant in
a living organism-may be inserted into a bacterial cell, for
example, and is then reproduced along with the host cell. The
gene and the bacterium are thus cloned simultaneously. 2 Al-
ternatively, a selected segment of DNA may be deleted, lead-
ing to organisms lacking or defective in one or more genes.13
Advancement in the field of genetic engineering has
progressed so rapidly that many such newly created organisms
are ready for use outside of the research laboratory.1 4 For ex-
ample, bacteria have been designed that can prevent frost
damage to crops, provide a biological means of pest control, or
digest toxic chemicals. Crop plants have been designed with
improved nitrogen fixation capabilities or resistance to
drought, disease, or herbicides.1 5 Other experiments involve
modifying crops so that they will produce more nutritious
proteins and provide some of their own fertilizer. Vaccines
against diseases that attack livestock are being produced by
biologists. Someday geneticists hope to engineer finer ani-
mals.16 With the world's population at nearly five billion and
quickly multiplying, 7 the benefits of genetic engineering in
11. Heckler 1, 587 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
12. Weaver, Beyond Supermouse: Changing Life's Genetic Blueprint, 166 Nat'l
Geographic 818, 820 (1984).
13. In non-scientific terms, the underlying concept of gene cloning has been de-
scribed as "cutting a printed page in half, inserting a new paragraph in the middle,
and photocopying the altered version over and over to reproduce the new material
along with the old." Id. at 820. Similarly, an existing paragraph may be deleted and
the page subsequently reproduced. The result is the creation of organisms that con-
tain new genetic information.
14. Baum, Genetic Engineering Engulfed in New Environmental Debate,
Chem.& Eng'g News, Aug. 13, 1984 at 15.
15. Id.
16. Weaver, supra note 12, at 818.
17. Id.
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the areas of agriculture and livestock appear promising.
Genetic engineering has made its mark in the field of
medicine as well. One molecular geneticist has commented
that "[b]iotechnology promises aid for millions of people who
suffer from diabetes and for thousands of youngsters afflicted
with dwarfism. Deadly human ailments including heart dis-
ease and cancer are beginning to yield to biotechnology's
weapons. So, too, may intractable genetic disorders such as
sickle-cell anemia. ' ' s
It is also anticipated that genetically altered bacteria may
be employed in the area of energy resources. One plan is to
extract petroleum from spent wells1 -a potentially fertile
source of this nation's energy. As much as 200 billion barrels
of oil, worth trillions of dollars, may be trapped under the
United States alone.20
B. The Berkeley Potato-Crop Experiment
The deliberate release experiment halted by the Rifkin
suit was a potato-crop experiment to be conducted by scien-
tists from the University of California at Berkeley. This ex-
periment, which was to begin on or about May 25, 1984, in-
volves the application of genetically-altered bacteria onto a
row of potatoes in northern California. The desired effect is to
make the plants more frost tolerant and thereby reduce the
risk of frost damage. 2' The experiment, designed by plant
pathologist Dr. Steven E. Lindow, involves the deletion of a
gene from a strain of bacterium called Pseudomonas syrin-
gae.2 ' Normal Pseudomonas syringae produces a protein
which acts as a center for ice formation or nucleation. This
protein plays a critical role in the formation of ice crystals on
plant surfaces at temperatures between zero and minus seven
18. Id.
19. Id. at 841.
20. Id.
21. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 755-56. On appeal, the court noted that the bacte-
ria would also be applied to plots of tomatoes and beans. Heckler II, 756 F.2d 143-
150 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
22. Baum, supra note 14, at 15-16.
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degrees Celsius.2" Lindow and his colleagues located the gene
that codes for the ice-nucleating protein, deleted a segment of
it, and then cloned the organisms with the defective gene. The
cloned organisms cannot code for functional protein and are
incapable of ice nucleation.24 The proposed field tests were
designed to examine the interaction of various strains of ice-
minus Pseudomonas syringae with natural populations of the
bacterium.25
C. The NIH Guidelines
In response to fears in the early 1970's concerning labora-
tory recombinant DNA experiments using Escherichia coli, a
common intestinal bacterium, scientists involved in recombi-
nant DNA research developed the NIH guidelines to regulate
such experiments.26 A review of the questions posed by the
possibility of genetic engineering was first made at the 1975
Asilomar Conference in California. 7 RAC, which is composed
primarily of eminent scientists in the field of recombinant
DNA research,2 8 had been created a few months prior to the
Asilomar Conference to advise the director of NIH 29 on re-
combinant DNA research questions. After the conference,
RAC drafted a comprehensive and detailed set of guidelines.30
Their purpose was to prevent the escape of modified orga-
nisms from the research laboratory, and if they should escape,
to guarantee that they could not survive.3'
23. Id. at 18.
24. The reverse of this process is used by ski resorts to improve their snowmak-
ing capabilities. See generally Ice-Plus Strains Make Snow for Ski-Resort Operators,
Biotech. Newswatch, Dec. 19, 1983 at 8.
25. Baum, supra note 14, at 18.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Heckler 11, 756 F.2d at 148.
28. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 755.
29. NIH is a federal agency whose legal authority (the NIH recombinant DNA
research guidelines) extends to all federally funded recombinant DNA research. Han-
son, Government Readies Rules for Biotechnology Control, Chem. & Eng'g News,
Aug. 13, 1984 at 35. However, since NIH is not a regulatory agency, it can enforce the
guidelines only by withholding or threatening to withhold financial support. Research
Guidelines Lead to Legal Entanglement, Chem. & Eng'g News, Aug. 13, 1984 at 16.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Baum, supra note 14, at 15.
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When issued in July, 1976, the guidelines prohibited five
categories of experiments, including an absolute ban on delib-
erate release experiments using recombinant DNA. 2 Based on
new scientific knowledge, substantial modification of the NIH
guidelines occurred in 1978, 1982, and 1983.,3 The most con-
troversial change occurred in 1978, allowing the director of
NIH, with the advice of RAC, to exempt experiments from
the blanket prohibitions contained in the 1976 guidelines on a
case-by-case basis. The first proposed deliberate release ex-
periment to be approved was presented in 1981.3"
D. The Rifkin Suit
In September 1983, Rifkin headed a group of plaintiffs
who filed suit to enjoin the NIH-approved Berkeley potato-
crop experiment and to block NIH approval of any other de-
liberate release experiments.3 5 The plaintiffs alleged that sev-
eral actions undertaken by NIH each required the issuance
under NEPA of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),
or at the minimum, an Environmental Assessment (EA) indi-
cating a finding of no significant environmental impact."
The first action taken by NIH was the 1978 modification
of the NIH Guidelines which permitted NIH to exempt delib-
erate release experiments on a case-by-case basis from the ab-
solute ban. Although an EA declaring a negative impact ac-
companied this decision, plaintiffs contend that a full EIS
should have been prepared.3 7 The district court agreed, 8 and
partially due to this finding, ordered a preliminary injunction
halting the approved deliberate release experiment and the
further approval of any similar experimentation. However, the
court of appeals vacated this part of this decision, concluding
that it was not a sufficient basis for the preliminary injunction
32. Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,911, 27,914-15
(1976).
33. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 758.
34. Heckler II, 756 F.2d at 150.
35. Heckler II, 756 F.2d at 146.
36. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 757.
37. Id. at 761.
38. Id. at 762.
1984]
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ordered. 9
Plaintiffs also contend that a programmatic EIS (PEIS)
should have been prepared in 1982 when NIH began to gener-
ally review and approve deliberate release experiments. 0
Again the district court agreed with plaintiffs' contentions,
but the court of appeals disagreed and vacated the part of the
preliminary injunction which halted the further approval of
deliberate release experiments.41
The third action taken by NIH was the approval of the
Berkeley potato-crop experiment without conducting an envi-
ronmental assessment and preparing an EA or EIS.42 On this
point, both courts agreed that NIH had failed to adequately
assess the need for an EIS under NEPA; the preliminary in-
junction halting the scheduled potato-crop experiment was
therefore affirmed by the court of appeals. The preliminary
injunction is still in effect pending a final determination on
the issues of the NEPA and APA violations.
III. NEPA
A. Application of NEPA
NEPA is comprised of three major sections. The first,
39. Heckler II, 756 F.2d at 158-59.
40. Heckler 1, 587 F. Supp. at 763.
41. Heckler 11, 756 F.2d at 159-60. Although the district court's decision to tem-
porarily halt all deliberate release experiments specifically exempted private research
companies that had voluntarily followed the NIH guidelines and had deliberate re-
lease experiments reviewed by RAC (Baum, supra note 14, at 16), Rifkin filed a mo-
tion in late July 1984, which, if granted, would have made the NIH guidelines
mandatory for most industrial experiments as well. Krieger, Genetic Engineering Re-
port, Chem. & Eng'g News, Aug. 13, 1984 at 12. In support of this motion, Rifkin
contended that:
Any firm that is a licensee under the patent held by Stanford University and
the University of California on research done by Stanley N. Cohen and Her-
bert W. Boyer is compelled to comply with the NIH guidelines under a clause
in the licensing agreement.
Baum, supra note 14, at 17. He therefore argued that until NIH compiles an EIS,
industrial deliberate release experiments must be halted. Practically all firms engaged
in genetic engineering research are licensed under the Cohen-Boyer patent. Id. How-
ever, because the court of appeals vacated the preliminary injunction that halted ap-
proval of all deliberate release experiments, Rifkin's above contention becomes moot.
42. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 757.
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section 101, 43 establishes a series of national and governmen-
tal goals for environmental quality. The second, section 102,
requires the preparation by responsible federal officials of an
EIS which is to be included in "every recommendation or re-
port on proposals for legislation and other major [flederal ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."'4  The third, section 202,' 5 creates the President's
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).4s
Section 102(2)(C), which is the action-enforcing section,'4
is the subject of the Rifkin suit. It is the controversy over the
interpretation of this section that has temporarily halted the
approved deliberate-release experiment.
When determining whether an EIS is required under sec-
tion 102(2)(C) of NEPA, the legislative intent behind the en-
tire statute must first be considered. According to the con-
gressional declaration, NEPA's purpose is to
[D]eclare a national policy which will encourage produc-
tive and enjoyable harmony between man and his envi-
ronment; to promote efforts which prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982).
44. Id. at § 4332.
45. Id. at § 4341.
46. G.C. Coggins & C.F. Wilkinson, Federal Public Land and Resources Law 261
(1981). The Council on Environmental Quality is the agency created by NEPA to
oversee implementation of the statute and to interpret its meaning. CEQ's interpreta-
tion of NEPA is embodied in the CEQ Guidelines, codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517
(1984).
47. Section 102(2)(C) states in relevant part that:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: ...
(2) all agencies of the [flederal Government shall-.. . (C) include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
[flederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-(i) the environ-
mental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alterna-
tives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss1/7
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the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understand-
ing of the ecological systems and natural resources impor-
tant to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environ-
mental Quality."'
The purpose of section 102(2)(C) in particular was best sum-
marized by the Supreme Court in Aberdeen & Rockfish Rail-
road Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Procedures
(SCRAP).49 The Court stated that NEPA created a distinct
procedural obligation on federal agencies to provide written
consideration of the environmental issues associated with cer-
tain major federal actions. The effect of this affirmative obli-
gation is to create a "right of action in adversely affected par-
ties to enforce that obligation." 0
A second but crucial purpose of this section is to provide
a source of information for the public and other parts of gov-
ernment concerning agency decisionmaking.5 1 Finally, section
102(2)(C) serves to provide an affirmative environmental rec-
ord for review in the event a determination as to the adequacy
of an agency's decision need be made.2
1. Federal Action
Under the language of the statute, the first threshold an
agency must cross when determining the applicability of
NEPA to proposals is whether the proposed action 3 is indeed
"[flederal. ' '1 4 Although the term was not defined by Congress
when the statute was enacted, one NEPA commentator has
48. Id. at § 4321.
49. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
50. Id. at 319.
51. Jones v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975).
52. McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TeL
L. Rev. 801, 805 (1977).
53. There are four types of major federal action that require either an EA or an
EIS. The first is "single actions" (which include site-specific actions); the second is
"connected actions" (often called programmatic action); the third is "cumulative ac-
tions," and the fourth is "similar actions" (which also provide a basis for program-
matic action). 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1984).
54. McGarity, supra note 52, at 837.
[Vol. 2
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concluded that Congress intended the phrase "[flederal ac-
tion" to be broadly inclusive, applying to virtually every en-
tity exercising the executive authority of the United States
Government. 5
The court in Scientists' Institute for Public Information
v. Atomic Energy Commission (SIPI)56 also makes clear that
federal action within the meaning of the statute not only ap-
plies when an agency initiates an action itself, but also when
an agency by its decision permits an action by other parties
which will have an impact on the environment.5 7 The CEQ
Guidelines," which are binding on all federal agencies,59 also
adopted this view.60
2. Major Federal Action
Once it is established that the actions taken by NIH are
federal, the second threshold that must be overcome by fed-
eral agencies is the determination of whether the projects are
"major" as well. Simmans v. Grant" held that this determina-
tion relies on an inquiry into whether the federal action is the
"precipitating cause of the resultant impact, regardless of who
or what may actually have caused the impact."62 Simply, if
"but for" the particular federal action the impact would not
have occurred, the federal action may be classified as major.
This interpretation, however, does not consider whether the
effect of the federal action itself is major.
Prior to Simmans, the court in Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. Grant (NRDC)65 classified a major fed-
eral action as one that requires a substantial amount of plan-
55. Id. at 838.
56. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 1088.
58. The CEQ Guidelines first became effective on July 30, 1979. 40 C.F.R. §
1506.12 (1984).
59. Id. at § 1500.3.
60. Id. at § 1508.18(b)(4).
61. 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
62. Id. at 14.
63. 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
1984]
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ning, time, resources, or expenditures.64 Natural Resources,
however, involved federally initiated action to contract for
and construct a watershed project which was partially feder-
ally funded.6 5 In the absence of entrepreneurial federal action,
it has been noted that the courts for the most part have classi-
fied the action as major without explanation."6
Contrary to Simmans and NRDC, the CEQ Guidelines
state that "'[m]ajor [flederal action' includes actions with ef-
fects that may be major and which are potentially subject to
federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does
not have a meaning independent of significantly .... ",67 This
interpretation diminishes the importance of the term "major"
as it stands independently, and conditions satisfaction of the
requirement on the third part of the NEPA analysis. Since
CEQ's Guidelines are the binding authority on federal agen-
cies for the interpretation of NEPA and are the agency's own
interpretation of the statute, this interpretation should be
given substantial deference. 8
64. Id. at 366-67.
65. Id. at 356-57, 361.
66. McGarity, supra note 52, at 842-45.
67. 40 C.F.R. at § 1508.18.
68. Although these guidelines do not have the force of law, they have consist-
ently been regarded with great deference when courts have been faced with problems
of statutory construction. See Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., 468 F.2d 1164,
1178 (6th Cir. 1972); Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244, 1246-47
(M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 552 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1975).
CEQ is the agency "ultimately responsible for administration of NEPA and most
familiar with its requirements." CEQ's interpretation of NEPA "is entitled to great
weight." Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1310 (1974)
(Douglas, J. Circuit Justice).
Although CEQ was created by NEPA, it derives its authority to issue guidelines
on EIS preparation not from the statute but from Exec. Order No. 11,514. The order
was issued "in furtherance of the purpose and policy of" NEPA. It gives CEQ the
power to "[ilssue guidelines to federal agencies for the preparation of detailed state-
ments on proposals for legislation and other federal actions affecting the environ-
ment, as required by section 102(2)(C) of [NEPA]." 3 C.F.R. 271, 272 § 3(h) (1974).
See Comment, The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and their Influ-
ence on the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 Cath. U.L. Rev. 547 (1974).
[Vol. 2
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3. Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting the
Quality of the Human Environment
The third and final threshold that must be crossed when
determining the applicability of NEPA to a particular major
federal action is whether or not such action "significantly" af-
fects the quality of the human environment. It is this require-
ment that is the most difficult to evaluate because of the
many factors that must be considered.
In 1972, the court in NRDC held that any action which
substantially affected, "beneficially or detrimentally the
depth or course of streams, plant life, wildlife habitats, fish
and wildlife, and the soil and the air 'significantly' affects the
quality of the human environment. '"61 The CEQ Guidelines
adopted this same approach, but with a slight variation. The
guidelines state that the term "significantly" first requires
considerations of both context and intensity.70 For example,
significance of site-specific action depends upon the effects in
a locale rather than in the world as a whole, and both short
term and long term effects are relevant.71 Responsible federal
officials must then look to the severity of the impact by con-
sidering a list of ten specific factors,72 one of which is
"[i]mpacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A signifi-
cant effect may exist even if the federal agency believes that
on balance the effect will be beneficial."' 7 This factor makes
NEPA applicable to a much wider range of federal action
than would otherwise be affected if only the significance of
adverse effects were to be considered.
B. Compliance with NEPA
To determine if an EIS is required under section
102(2)(C) of NEPA, first an environmental assessment7' must
69. 341 F. Supp. at 367 (emphasis added).
70. 40 C.F.R. at § 1508.27.
71. Id. at § 1508.27(a).
72. Id. at § 1508.27(b).
73. Id. at § 1508.27(b)(1).
74. Id. at § 1508.9.
1984]
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss1/7
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
be made by the responsible federal agency.7 5 If that assess-
ment finds evidence of a major federal action with a signifi-
cant impact on the environment, then the more detailed EIS
is required. 6 If however, the assessment finds evidence of no
significant impact, then a written finding of no significant im-
pact in the form of an EA must be prepared." The contents
of the EA is briefly summarized by the CEQ in its own Guide-
lines.78 The court in Simmans, however, incorporated EPA's
guidelines of 1973 in its decision when considering what fac-
tors should be considered in an EA. The court summarized
these helpful factors as follows:
(1) [a] brief description of project; (2) [the] probable im-
pact of the project on the environment; (3) any probable
adverse environmental effects which cannnot be avoided;
(4) alternatives considered with evaluations of each; (5)
relationship between local short-term uses of environment
and maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity; (6) an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources; (7) public objections to project, if any, and
their resolution; (8) agencies consulted about the project;
(9) reasons for concluding there will be no significant
impacts.79
The preparation of this "mini" environmental analysiss0 in-
75. Id. at § 1501.4(b).
76. Id. at §§ 1501.4(c), 1508.11.
77. Id. at §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13.
78. A finding of no significant impact by a federal agency requires the federal
agency to produce a document,
presenting the reasons why an action, not otherwise excluded (§ 1508.4), will
not have a significant effect on the human environment and for which an
environmental impact statement therefore will not be prepared. It shall in-
clude the environmental assessment or a summary of it and shall note any
other environmental documents related to it (§ 1501.7(a)(5)). If the assess-
ment is included, the finding need not repeat any of the discussion in the
assessment but may incorporate it by reference.
Id. at § 1508.13.
79. 370 F. Supp. at 17. See generally Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 401-02
(1976) (where there is no regional plan, there is no basis for preparation of a
programmatic EIS).
80. 370 F. Supp at 17.
[Vol. 2-
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sures that the courts will have available to them a reviewable
environmental record." In its absence, one of the purposes of
NEPA is circumvented.
If NIH is guilty of any NEPA violation, without a doubt
it was for its failure to prepare an EA or any other environ-
mental record 82 when it began reviewing deliberate release ex-
periments in 1982 and when it approved the Berkeley
experiment.
However, defendants in the Rifkin suit contended that
"strict compliance with NEPA's requirements were unneces-
sary because their actions constituted the functional
equivalent of a traditional NEPA inquiry." 83 According to the
CEQ Guidelines, an exception to NEPA compliance exists
only when there is an unavoidable conflict in statutory au-
thority."' The courts, however, have created one other excep-
tion to NEPA compliance. As explained in Environmental
Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency (EDF),85
the "functional equivalent" doctrine was first developed in
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,86 and was applied
only to action taken by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The basis for this deci-
sion was that CAA section 111 requires the functional
equivalent of an EIS, and that EPA was an agency whose
raison d'etre is the protection of the environment.8 7
The court in EDF, however, made clear that this doctrine
should only apply where an agency is primarily engaged in an
examination of environmental questions and has substantively
and procedurely given "full and adequate consideration" to
environmental issues.8 8 Aside from the controversy over
whether NIH is an agency engaged primarily in an examina-
81. A federal agency has an affirmative obligation under NEPA to create a re-
viewable environmental record. Id.
82. 40 C.F.R. at §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.9(1).
83. Heckler 1, 587 F. Supp. 753, 765 (D.D.C. 1984), affd, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
84. 40 C.F.R. at § 1500.3.
85. 489 F.2d 1247, 1255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
86. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
87. EDF, 489 F.2d at 1256, discussing Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 384-87.
88. 489 F.2d at 1257.
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tion of environmental questions, the fact that no recorded
document is required for an RAC review of deliberate release
experiments precludes NIH from the limited NEPA exemp-
tion. The basis for this conclusion is that NIH lacks any pro-
cedural standards of its own which may be substituted for an
EIS. It would therefore appear that absent a recorded docu-
ment to take the place of an EIS, defendants' contention of a
functional equivalent defense cannot be realistically enter-
tained. The rationale behind the district court's decision on
this issue was virtually the same.89 The court of appeals did
not consider it.
IV. Discussion
The main issues presented in the Rifkin suit are whether
an EIS was required for each of the following actions: NIH's
1978 guideline modifications; NIH's decision to begin review-
ing deliberate release experiments in 1982; and NIH's ap-
proval of the Berkeley potato-crop experiment in 1983.
A. Federal Action
NIH is a federal agency, and although it was not initiat-
ing any action when it approved the Berkeley deliberate re-
lease experiment, it has by its decision permitted the scien-
tists at the University of California to begin their field testing
in the general environment. Under the holding of SIPI, this
approval clearly qualifies as "[flederal action." Similarly, the
decisions by NIH to modify its guidelines for recombinant
DNA research and to begin reviewing deliberate release exper-
iments in 1982 were self-initiated and therefore deserving of
"[flederal" classification.
B. Major Federal Action
Since a determination of whether an action is "major"
under NEPA hinges on whether the action is "significant," a
discussion of whether the actions of NIH are major must
89. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 765-66.
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await a significance analysis.
C. Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting the Quality
of the Human Environment
In view of the analysis in the previous section, both the
beneficial and adverse effects of the Berkeley potato-crop ex-
periment must be considered when determining if it will "sig-
nificantly" affect the quality of the human environment.
Under the CEQ Guidelines, the first step in the signifi-
cance analysis is to define the context of the proposed action.
For example, the decision to approve the Berkeley experiment
has a potential impact on many aspects of the environment
including plant and insect life. Of course these aspects could
be better defined by scientists involved in recombinant DNA
research, but the above aspects are sufficient for this analysis.
Once the context is defined, the intensity of the action
must be analyzed. As mentioned previously, this analysis must
include a variety of factors that are outlined by the CEQ
Guidelines. In addition to the beneficial and adverse impacts,
they are: 1) the degree to which the proposed action affects
public health or safety; 2) the unique characteristics of the
geographic area; 3) the degree to which the effects are likely to
be controversial; 4) the degree to which the possible effects
are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks; 5)
the degree to which the action may establish a precedent; 6)
cumulative impacts; 7) the degree to which the action may ad-
versely affect historic, cultural, or scientific resources; 8) the
degree to which the action may affect an endangered species;
and 9) whether the action would violate federal, state, or local
law.90 At this point, the responsible federal officials should fol-
low up with a pre- and post-action comparison of the affected
environment and limit the studied changes to those that are
likely to result from the "major [flederal action."91
The evaluation of significant beneficial or adverse effects
is subject to a rule of reason. Agencies need not "forsee the
90. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (1984).
91. McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 Tex.
L. Rev. 801, 848-850 (1977).
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unforeseeable," but should not avoid the preparation of an
EIS merely because describing the effects and alternatives
"involves some degree of forecasting."92 One of the functions
of an EIS is to indicate the degree to which effects on the
environment are essentially unknown. The court in Sierra
Club v. Peterson" reiterated this interpretation when it held
that, "[i]f any 'significant' environmental impacts might result
from the proposed agency action then an EIS must be pre-
pared before the action is taken."' 4 The beneficial or adverse
effects therefore need not be absolute in order to assess the
significance of their impact on the quality of the human
environment.
In fact, possible adverse effects have been given great
consideration in decisions concerning similar actions that were
subject to NEPA compliance. In Save Our Ecosystems v.
Clark,'5 a consolidated case involving the spraying of herbi-
cides on federally owned lands, the court emphasized the im-
portance of explicating possible adverse effects in the deci-
sionmaking process. Although the decision to approve the
herbicides in each instance was accompanied by an EIS, the
court went on to say that an EIS itself should include a worst
case analysis if "the information relevant to adverse impacts
is important to the decision and the means to obtain it are not
known (e.g., the means for obtaining it are beyond the state of
the art) . . . ."" The agency shall then balance the need for
the action with the risk and severity of possible adverse im-
pacts. If the agency chooses to proceed, it must then include a
worst case analysis and an indication of the probability of its
occurrence.'
7
The decision to approve the Berkeley experiment falls
squarely within the above considerations. Without the oppor-
92. SIPI, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
93. 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 1415 (emphasis added).
95. 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 1243 n.4 (quoting the CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (b)(2)
(1984)).
97. Id. See also Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark,
720 F.2d 1475 (9th Cir. 1983).
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tunity to field test, the adverse effects to the environment, if
any, are virtually unknown, and the means for obtaining such
information are beyond the state of the art until the experi-
ment is actually conducted. In this light, if the need for the
experiment outweighs the known risk and severity of potential
adverse impacts, a worst case analysis must be prepared to aid
the agency in making its final decision. As the Save Our Eco-
systems decision states:
Even one chance out of 10,000 that a catastrophic event
* . . would occur is relevant information to a decision-
maker. Even if an event is unlikely, if responsible scien-
tific critics present opposing points of view as to the pos-
sible environmental effects of a project, the agency has an
obligation to respond to those views. 8
What we can infer from this case is that if such uncertain sig-
nificant adverse effects must be considered in the EIS itself,
then the adverse effects that may trigger the necessity of an
EIS under NEPA may be uncertain as well. In this respect,
even low probability but high risk effects can be given suffi-
cient consideration, and such consideration will subsequently
be available for public review.
In the controversy over the release of modified bacteria in
the Berkeley potato-crop experiment, plaintiff Jeremy Rifkin
has alleged that by changing one phenotypic characteristic 9
of an organism, another unanticipated phenotypic characteris-
tic might appear. According to Rifkin, the ensuing problem is
that the traits which determine whether a particular microbe
(modified bacteria) would thrive in a particular environment
are not clear. 100 Mr. Rifkin has also suggested that the mi-
crobe could possibly alter weather patterns and disrupt eco-
logical balances. He fears that perhaps the microbes will mi-
98. Save Our Ecosystems, 747 F.2d at 1245 n.6.
99. A phenotypic characteristic is one which is visible to the eye as opposed to a
hereditary or genetic trait.
100. Baum, Genetic Engineering Engulfed in New Environmental Debate,
Chem. & Eng'g News, Aug. 13, 1984 at 20.
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grate and create havoc.101 Additionally, he is concerned with
the long-term cumulative impacts of releasing genetically en-
gineered products.102
Rifkin also alleges that the microbes could become estab-
lished in the environment and alter the natural ecology. How-
ever, Professor Lindow and most other scientists consider this
probability to be non-existent. Professor Lindow has stated
that " '[o]n a sunny day, these same types of mutations, if not
the exact mutation, are being created .... If these bacteria
were going to become the dominant form on plants, they
would already have done so.' "103 Lastly, Professor Lindow has
claimed that Rifkin's scenario is irrelevant to his potato-crop
experiment because the experiment is small-scale.10 4
A March 1984 House subcommittee report concluded that
there is a low probability but high consequence of risk
presented by deliberately releasing genetically engineered or-
ganisms into the environment.10 5 Although the report made
clear that no damage to any ecosystem caused by genetically
engineered organisms is known of, it refers to Dutch elm dis-
ease, the Kudzu vine, and the gypsy moth as examples of ex-
otic species that created havoc when introduced into new en-
vironments. 10 6  However, Dr. Bernard D. Davis1 0 7  has
explained that such analogies are irrelevant to the release of
modified bacteria:
101. Bellew, Life on the Land: Agricultural Research, Once Little Noticed,
Grows Controversial, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
102. Krieger, Genetic Engineering Report, Chem. & Eng'g News, Aug. 13, 1984
at 12.
103. Baum, supra note 100, at, 18. In fact, Microlife Tecnics, Inc. (MT) of Sara-
sota, Florida had been quietly spraying naturally mutated strains of ice-minus
Erwinia (another type of bacteria), to frost-sensitive crops in California, Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, Ohio, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington for three years as
of the date of the report. MT had been testing the bacteria under contract for the
University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. Microlife Tecnics Field-Tests
Natural Ice-Minus Bacteria, Biotech. Newswatch, Dec. 19, 1983 at 8.
104. Baum, supra note 100, at 18-19.
105. Hanson, Government Readies Rules for Biotechnology Control, Chem. &
Eng'g News, Aug. 13, 1984 at 35.
106. Id.
107. Dr. Bernard Davis is an Adele Lehman Professor of Bacterial Physiology at
the Harvard Medical School.
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Such explosions have occurred only where a species was
transferred to a new continent, where it no longer encoun-
tered the animals and plants that held it in check in its
native habitat. But a bacterium that is modified geneti-
cally will not encounter such an ecological vacuum when
released to its original environment, as in the ice experi-
ment. Moreover, unlike higher organisms, bacteria can be
distributed through the air and identical species are
found on all continents.108
The potato-crop experiment would therefore superficially ap-
pear to have no significant adverse effects. In fact, if success-
ful, the experiment may have significant beneficial effects.
This is especially possible since classical methods of frost con-
trol have been noted to entail many problems. 10
The real test for significant beneficial or adverse effects,
however, must come from the responsible federal agency
where a variety of factors and conditions may be scientifically
considered. If either the beneficial or adverse effects are found
to be significant, then the action will also be considered major
and a full EIS must be prepared.
The district court, referring to the Berkeley potato-crop
experiment, held that plaintiffs "identified several areas of
plausible concern which... [were] not rebutted on the formal,
or informal, record .... "110 One possible effect of the experi-
ment was noted to be the potential hazard to adjacent plant
and insect populations. Despite Berkeley's contentions that
RAC's informal review process adequately justified the NIH
Director's finding of no significant impact, the court stated
that any merit in this type of review is "significantly dimin-
ished by the lack of any written criteria to guide the NIH Di-
rector's ultimate decision." ' On this basis, the court found
108. Davis, Judge Sirica Chills Genetic Research, Wall St. J., July 13, 1984, at
18, col. 4; see generally Brill, Safety Concerns and Genetic Engineering in Agricul-
ture, 227 Science 381, 382-83 (1985).
109. Lindow, Methods of Preventing Frost Injury Caused by Epiphytic Ice-Nu-
cleation-Active Bacteria, 67 Plant Disease 327 (1983).
110. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. 753, 767-68 (1984), afl'd, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
111. Id. at 767-68.
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that a NEPA violation was probable enough to support a pre-
liminary injunction.' 1 2
On appeal, the federal appellants contended that NIH's
only flaw was its failure to publish the results of its environ-
mental assessment. The court, however, concluded that the
deficiency rests not in which document contains the environ-
mental analysis, but rather in NIH's "complete failure to con-
sider the possibility of various environmental effects."' 13 The
court pointed out that the minutes of the RAC meeting, the
only document which considered the environmental impact of
the dispersion of the microbes, dealt with the possible envi-
ronmental impact in the following single sentence: "'Although
some movement of bacteria toward sites near treatment loca-
tions by insect or aerial transport is possible, the numbers of
viable cells transported has been shown to be very small; and
these cells are subject to biological and physical processes lim-
iting survival.' ,,4 Thus, Judge Wright held that an EA which
fails to address significant environmental considerations can-
not be deemed adequate support for a decision that an EIS is
not required." 8
Judge Wright also rejected the NIH Director's conclusory
statement of " 'no significant risk'" which was made when he
gave final approval to the Berkeley experiment, and held that
NIH must "complete a far more adequate environmental as-
sessment ."16 which must "provide sufficient evidence and
analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental
impact statement or a finding of no significant impact." 1" 7
The court additionally noted that even unknown risks must
be considered in accordance with the CEQ Guidelines." 8
Therefore, until a sufficient assessment is made, the question
of whether an EIS is required remains open. Nevertheless, the
court stated that since the EIS for the original guidelines
112. Id. at 768.
113. Heckler 11, 756 F.2d 143, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 154.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (1984)).
118. Id. (citing CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (1984)).
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identified the problem with deliberate release experiments as
a potential environmental hazard, unless NIH can now show
otherwise, this fact will weigh heavily in support of the view
that an EIS should be prepared." 9 Accordingly, the prelimi-
nary injunction remains in effect for the Berkeley potato-crop
experiment.
A "significance" analysis for the 1978 decision to modify
the guidelines would be difficult to do because there is no con-
text in which to study the effects of such a decision. The field
of microbial biology is vast and complex. To study the impact
of deliberate release experiments in general would appear to
be impossible. Since no particular experiments were contem-
plated or approved at the time, no specific affected region can
be analyzed as is required under the CEQ Guidelines.'20 Addi-
tionally, in the absence of the ability to define the context of
an action, the intensity of its effects becomes somewhat of an
abstract and futile task. It therefore follows that without con-
sideration of both context and intensity, the term "signifi-
cantly" as used in NEPA cannot be interpreted. Accordingly,
if the action cannot be labelled as significant, neither can it be
labelled as major under the CEQ Guidelines.' 2 Thus, an EIS
for the decision to revise the guidelines should not be re-
quired. The decision may be viewed merely as a decision to
decide, giving the NIH director the discretion to approve a
deliberate-release experiment at a future date, based on its
own merits. At this stage, then, there can be no significant
impact.
Judge Sirica of the district court decided that the Direc-
tor of NIH, in his decision to modify the guidelines, failed to
meet three of the four criteria that were initially set forth in
Maryland National Park & Planning Commission v. United
States Postal Service.'2 The court found that NIH did not
take a "hard look" at the problem, did not identify the rele-
vant areas of environmental concern and, as to the problems
119. 756 F.2d at 154-155.
120. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a) (1984).
121. Id. at § 1508.18.
122. 487 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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studied and identified, did not make a convincing case that
the impact was insignificant. Judge Sirica concluded that
"[t]he Director approved major [f]ederal action without the
benefit of a specific or general investigation into the environ-
mental hazards of deliberate release experimentation." 2 ' On
this basis, the court believed that the plaintiffs would prevail
on their claims of a NEPA or APA violation and therefore
ordered a preliminary injunction halting NIH's approval of all
further deliberate release experimentation.
The court failed to note, however, the difficulty of study-
ing the "significance" of a "decision to decide" in the absence
of a definitive context. If the court had deferred to the CEQ
Guidelines at this stage of its decision, the relative "insignifi-
cance" of this decision to decide would have been realized
instead.
In the instance of a non-significant impact, the court in
Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Exon 24 succinctly ex-
plained that:
Environmental protection would not be served by requir-
ing an EIS where a major [flederal action is insignificant
within the meaning of NEPA. The amount of time that
the preparation of a full-blown impact statement entails
is out of proportion to the environmental risks involved.
If a project's impacts are insignificant, the efforts of the
decision-making entity can be directed toward the com-
pletion of proposed actions rather than the preparation of
detailed documents that serve no environmental
interest. 125
Therefore, in the case of deliberate release experiments, the
appropriate time to consider preparation of an EIS is when an
individual experiment is proposed. 26 Only then can an analy-
123. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 762.
124. 466 F. Supp. 639 (D. Neb. 1979).
125. Id. at 647-48. See also Sierra Club v. Bergland, 451 F. Supp. 120, 129 (N.D.
Miss. 1978).
126. According to the Court in SCRAP, "the time at which the agency must pre-
pare the final 'statement' is the time at which it makes a recommendation or report
on a proposal for federal action." 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975). The CEQ Guidelines have
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sis of significant effects be realistically made.
The court of appeals affirmed this view when it held that
"the 1978 policy change did not necessarily represent the
'point of commitment' that triggers NEPA. '127 The revisions
did not irrevocably commit NIH to any decision, and NIH
had the authority to grant or deny approval of deliberate re-
lease experiments on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, since
the modifications were made prior to the time when the delib-
erate release of genetic experiments was considered feasible,
the court stated that it was senseless to base a judgment for
prospective relief "on decisions made several years ago under
very different circumstances.' For these reasons, the court
held that to focus on the 1978 revisions as an independent
basis for injunctive relief and the preparation of an EIS was
inappropriate. 129
The plaintiffs' final allegation that a PEIS should have
been prepared when NIH first began reviewing deliberate re-
lease experiments in 1982 again presents obstacles that hinder
interpretation of the term "significantly" under NEPA.
A program decision is one that treats "a group of existent
or contemplated actions as a single unit."130 According to the
CEQ Guidelines, however, the actions cannot be randomly as-
sociated, but instead must be connected, 131 cumulative, 132 or
also confirmed this view. 40 C.F.R. at § 1508.23. On this basis, an EIS should have
been prepared and issued as part of the decision to approve the experiment. In prac-
tice, this means that a draft EIS should have been prepared when the University of
California at Berkeley submitted its proposal to NIH for approval of the potato-crop
experiment.
127. Heckler II, 756 F.2d at 158.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. McGarity, supra note 91, at 808.
131. 40 C.F.R. at § 1508.25(1). The CEQ Guidelines state in relevant part that:
Connected actions . . .means that they are closely related and therefore
should be discussed in the same impact statement. Actions are connected if
they: (i) Automatically trigger other actions which may require environmen-
tal impact statements. (ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are
taken previously or simultaneously. (iii) Are interdependent parts of a larger
action and depend on the larger action for their justification.
132. Id. at § 1508.25(2). The CEQ Guidelines state in relevant part that: "Cumu-
lative actions, which when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively sig-
nificant impacts and should therefore be discussed in the same impact statement."
1984]
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol2/iss1/7
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
similar. s13 Although NIH may have approved or reviewed sev-
eral deliberate release experiments within a period of time,
plaintiffs have failed to show that the experiments meet the
criteria outlined by the. CEQ Guidelines in order for them to
be considered connected or similar. As a result, interpreting
the significance of such experiments as a program is again
hindered by the inability to define a context and to subse-
quently study the intensity of an impact. The major obstacle
is that no existing program has been proven. Consequently,
such action should not be considered "major" and therefore
should not require an EIS.
The district court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that a
PEIS was necessary when NIH began reviewing deliberate re-
lease experiments in 1982. The court found that 1) a PEIS
could provide a uniform standard that may have been used to
initially approve the three deliberate release experiments; 2)
the NIH guidelines may be viewed as a comprehensive pro-
gram "which purports to directly govern all NIH-related re-
search involving the deliberate release of recombinant mate-
rial into the environment"134 ; and 3) there is a "substantial
likelihood" that the authorization of experiments "using the
same novel technology are 'connected,'. . . potentially 'cumu-
lative,' . . . and sufficiently 'similar.' "135 But as was noted
above, although the technology may be the same, the orga-
nisms that are altered may vary, the nature of the experi-
ments themselves may vary, and the affected regions may
vary. The terms "connected," "cumulative," and "similar" be-
come useless when the alleged similarity goes no further than
the general type of project and provide no context in which to
analyze the effects of an action.
133. Id. at § 1508.25(3). The CEQ Guidelines state in relevant part that:
Similar actions, which when viewed with other reasonably foreseeable or pro-
posed agency actions, have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating
their environmental conseqencies [sic) together, such as common timing or
geography. An agency may wish to analyze these actions in the same impact
statement. It should do so when the best way to assess adequately the com-
bined impacts of similar actions or reasonable alternatives to such actions is
to treat them in a single impact statement.
134. Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. at 764.
135. Id. at 764.
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On appeal, Judge Wright noted that a "programmatic
EIS should be prepared if it can be forward-looking and if its
absence will obstruct environmental review." 6 Moreover, the
court held that if NIH adequately considered environmental
factors for each deliberate release experiment, the absence of
a PEIS would not be obstructing environmental review since a
site-specific EIS would be a far more complete and rigorous
analysis. Although the court agreed with the district court's
finding that a PEIS would be helpful for future planning, it
concluded that this consideration alone was not sufficient to
support a finding of necessity for a PEIS. For these reasons,
the court reversed the district court's finding that plaintiffs
are likely to succeed in showing that NIH should have pre-
pared a PEIS for deliberate release experiments. It should be
noted, however, that as to future decisions to approve deliber-
ate release experiments, the court pointed out that NIH
should at least consider the advisability of a PEIS to comply
with NEPA and the CEQ Guidelines.13 7 The court therefore
vacated the part of the preliminary injunction enjoining NIH
approval of all deliberate release experimentation.
In summation, the only NIH action that appears to
clearly require the preparation of a full-blown EIS was the de-
cision to approve the Berkeley potato-crop experiment.'" The
final determination, however, will be made by the District
Court when it decides on the merits of NIH's alleged NEPA
and APA violations. Until then, the preliminary injunction
halting the Berkeley potato-crop experiment remains in effect.
V. Conclusion
The impact NEPA has on environmental effects of fed-
eral agency decisionmaking relies heavily on compliance by
each individual agency, and compliance can be effectively in-
sured only by judicial enforcement.
In the long run, initial compliance with the EIS require-
136. Heckler H, 756 F.2d at 159.
137. Id. at 160.
138. Although NIH released a 60-page EA declaring a negative impact in early
February, the sufficiency of this EA is still subject to judicial review.
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ment would appear to benefit rather than cripple the field of
genetic engineering. By timely preparation of an EIS (if the
circumstances dictate a need for one), the responsible federal
agency assures itself that it has reviewed environmental con-
siderations and that it has affirmatively developed an environ-
mental record for outside review. Simultaneously it will have
provided the public with the relevant influential factors con-
sidered in the making of its major decisions, as well as with a
detailed statement of the nature of the projects involved. The
result would be a decrease in the number of suits initiated to
halt genetic experiments in fear of an environmental catastro-
phe. Compliance with the statute would reduce the need for
judicial intervention.
The first major step towards giving NEPA the substan-
tive impact it needs to be effective is to create more definitive
guidelines on the meanings of threshold terms such as "ma-
jor," "federal," and "significantly" so that both the agencies
and the courts have a consistent basis for an EIS assessment.
The second major step is to stress in an amendment to NEPA
itself the binding authority that the CEQ Guidelines have on
federal agencies when they interpret the provisions of NEPA.
This step will help to insure consistent application of the
Guidelines.
At the same time, however, Congress and the judiciary
should pay heed to avoid the total incapacitation of govern-
ment agencies and the halting of scientific progress that might
result from overly broad requirements for an EIS. Purely ad-
ministrative matters, such as "decisions to decide," which
have no actual impact on the environment, should be ex-
empted from EIS requirements. The wisdom of this view was
accepted in the drafting of the APA, which exempts adminis-
trative matters from notice and comment requirements.13
Lastly, with these goals in mind, it may be inspiring to
recall what Justice Douglas expressed in the SCRAP decision:
"NEPA is more than a technical statute of administrative
139. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982).
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procedure. It is a commitment to the preservation of our
environment. ,140
Elizabeth Pizzulli
140. 422 U.S. 289, 331 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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